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FREE SPEECH IN THE BALANCE: JUDICIAL 
SANCTIONS AND FRIVOLOUS SLAPP SUITS 
Shine Sean Tu* & Nicholas F. Stump**
           The balance between free speech and access to courts in 
defamation tort actions is fraught with public policy concerns. On one 
hand, plaintiffs should have unencumbered access to the justice system 
to remedy real harms brought upon them by defamatory statements. 
However, defamation suits should not be wielded to suppress the 
constitutionally protected free speech rights of news organizations and 
of concerned citizens that are vital for well-functioning democracies. 
This Article argues for a new type of remedy, namely enhanced Rule 11 
attorney sanctions, such as suspension or debarment, that should be 
available to defendants of defamation suits brought by repeat players 
that use “cookie-cutter” complaints. This Article specifically proposes a 
novel four-part test implicating use of attorney sanctions as a remedy for 
filing niche types of frivolous lawsuits. Per this test, a court should weigh 
the following factors to determine if such sanctions are warranted: (1) if 
the plaintiff habitually files and loses defamation-type suits to prevent 
protected free speech; (2) the nature of the defendant, especially if the 
defendant is a news organization; (3) the proportionality of the damages 
requested, and; (4) if a countersuit is at issue. 
           In this Article, we examine a case study in the form of a decades’ 
long frivolous litigation pattern exhibited by Murray Energy and Robert 
Murray as its CEO. Murray Energy has been characterized as the single 
largest privately-owned coal corporation in the United States, and thus 
constitutes a prominent actor well-suited for assessing the potential 
strengths and weaknesses of developing this new remedy. We ultimately 
conclude that enhanced Rule 11 attorney sanctions, as weighed and 
levied vis-à-vis the proffered test, could constitute a potentially potent 
deterrent to frivolous lawsuits designed to inhibit the free speech of the 
press and of concerned citizens—which indeed occupy a crucial 
watchdog role in healthy democracies. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
Current remedies are ineffective at halting frivolous lawsuits 
intended to suppress constitutionally protected free speech, rather than 
to make the injured party whole—generally termed Strategic Lawsuits 
Against Public Participation (SLAPP) suits.1 Remedies for such 
frivolous lawsuits include early dismissal at the 12(b)(6) stage as well 
as attorney’s fees.2 However, such monetary remedies often prove 
insufficient when the legally savvy, well-capitalized parties that 
typically bring SLAPP suits make a simple cost-benefit analysis. That 
is, such parties conclude that the benefits of suppressing critical 
speech via SLAPP suits—i.e., including the projected future benefits 
of chilling later-in-time critical speech—outweighs the direct costs of 
any monetary sanctions.3 Rational SLAPP suit filers therefore often 
determine that these frivolous suits constitute, on the balance, an 
exceedingly fair bargain; consequently, the free speech of the press 
and of related watchdog entities is suppressed by such powerful 
actors—to the profound detriment of core democratic principles.4 
This Article argues for a new remedy to combat such frivolous 
lawsuits, which involves courts utilizing a four-part test to determine 
if Rule 11 sanctions are warranted. We argue that, in certain situations, 
deterrence is best achieved when sanctions are directed towards the 
attorneys filing frivolous lawsuits, and not the plaintiffs bringing 
them. Thus, to achieve actual deterrence, courts should apply 
sanctions against attorneys that file such suits—as compared to the 
well-capitalized clients that prove all too willing to absorb the 
relatively small monetary sanctions. Moreover, the appropriate 
remedy for particularly egregious SLAPP suits should be attorney 
suspension or debarment; as noted above, monetary damages often 
prove insufficient in deterring powerful plaintiffs, and thus such 
institutional-professional ramifications for involved attorneys are 
required for true deterrence. Attorneys, then, should function as 
gatekeepers against frivolous lawsuits—which is a proper role given 
their institutional expertise and ethical responsibilities. As this Article 
 
 1. Laura J. Ericson-Siegel, Comment, Silencing SLAPPs: An Examination of Proposed 
Legislative Remedies and a “Solution” for Florida, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 487, 496 (1992). 
 2. Id; Michael Eric Johnston, A Better SLAPP Trap: Washington State’s Enhanced Statutory 
Protection for Targets of “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation”, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 
263, 264 (2002/3). 
 3. Johnston, supra note 2, at 264. 
 4. Id. 
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contends, such enhanced sanctions are warranted for those particularly 
egregious circumstances where attorneys merely “cut and paste” 
complaints from suits previously dismissed at the 12(b)(6) or 
summary judgment stage. 
This Article examines a case study as one important exemplar of 
such egregious misconduct: a decades’ long litigation pattern 
exhibited by Murray Energy, pertinent subsidiaries, and Robert 
Murray as its CEO designed to halt the critical speech of news 
agencies. Our case study reveals that such “cut and paste” complaint 
strategies were utilized in a series of cases dismissed at the 12(b)(6) or 
summary judgment stage in the Murray Energy litigation context—
and that traditional remedies designed to curtail such frivolous suits 
indeed proved insufficient. As a consequence, this case study 
demonstrates that the variety of enhanced Rule 11 sanctions explored 
in this Article likely are required to combat such deeply problematic 
litigation patterns. 
This Article will proceed as follows. Part I provides an overview 
of SLAPP suits and of anti-SLAPP legislation adopted in some 
jurisdictions. Part II proffers a case study in the form of particularly 
egregious SLAPP litigation pattern exhibited by Murray enterprises. 
Part III discusses potential solutions to frivolous SLAPP suits. Part IV 
focuses on the use of Rule 11 sanctions to deter attorneys from filing 
frivolous suits. Part V proposes a novel, four-part test to determine if 
such enhanced attorney sanctions are warranted. Finally, Part VI 
ultimately concludes that enhanced Rule 11 attorney sanctions likely 
are required to curtail such frivolous lawsuits that are greatly 
detrimental to free speech of the press and thus ultimately to core 
democratic values. 
I.  STRATEGIC LAWSUITS AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION SUITS 
SLAPP suits are civil lawsuits generally filed against news 
organizations, private individuals, or non-governmental agencies that 
communicate with government bodies, officials, or the electorate on 
specific issues of public interest or concern.5 These suits can involve 
environmental concerns; neighborhood concerns (e.g., siting issues 
involving dumps, toxic waste disposals, and mines); dissatisfied 
 
 5. George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 PACE 
ENV’T L. REV. 3, 7–8 (1989). 
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consumers or tenants; and opponents of urban or suburban 
development.6 As examples, SLAPP suits often are filed by “real 
estate developers, property owners, police officers, alleged polluters, 
business owners, and state or local government agencies.”7 The goals 
of SLAPP suits are fourfold: (1) to recover for financial losses due to 
successful opposition regarding an issue of public interest; (2) to 
prevent future losses on similar subsequent public policy issues; (3) to 
intimidate and deter others from joining the opposition; and (4) to 
silence current and future opposition to the political issue.8 
SLAPP suit filers improperly wield litigation as an instrument to 
suppress political claims and public debate.9 The filer focuses on the 
judicial process to silence the target and has scant concern about the 
substantive outcome of the litigation.10 SLAPP filers utilize the 
judicial system because of perceived and genuine advantages. First, 
filers—unlike respondents—typically have the advantage of 
familiarity with the judicial system. Second, use of the judicial system 
advantages filers with access to large amounts of capital. Third, there 
is the potential psychological trauma individual respondents 
experience when faced with multimillion-dollar lawsuits—i.e., filers 
use the legal system as a psychological weapon.11 And more broadly, 
damage to reputational, personal, financial, and psychological 
interests are harms that are usually not as poignant with corporations 
as compared to individual respondents.12 Fourth, and finally, SLAPP 
filers have an added advantage of reaping indirect, later-in-time 
benefits, in that such suits disincentivize future parties from filing suit 
or bringing public attention to the issue due to fear of financial 
retribution.13 
 
 6. Penelope Canan, The SLAPP from a Sociological Perspective, 7 PACE ENV’T L. REV. 23, 
25 (1989). 
 7. Id. at 26. 
 8. Ericson-Siegel, supra note 1, at 492. 
 9. Canan, supra note 6, at 23. 
 10. J. Reid Mowrer, Casenote, Protection of the Public Against Litigious Suits (“PPALS”): 
Using 1993 Federal Rule 11 to Turn SLAPPs Around, 38 NAT. RES. J. 465, 466 (1998). 
 11. Canan, supra note 6, at 26 (stating that the average SLAPP suit was for $9 million). 
 12. Id. at 26–29 (describing the case of Victor Monia whose career and personal life were 
detrimentally affected by his fear of a $40,150,000 suit). 
 13. Id. (describing a SLAPP lawsuit brought by Parnas Corporation against multiple 
homeowners’ associations and their presidents in which the company deposed city council 
members to cause fear in the community and which led to the homeowners’ groups dissolving 
because they feared the financial liability associated with the suit). 
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SLAPP suits constitute a particularly enticing option for those 
filers that possess substantial amounts of capital. Specifically, for 
those filers who are worth millions or even billions of dollars, a few 
thousand spent on legal fees to suppress negative speech may be an 
exceedingly fair bargain.14 For instance, with “eco-SLAPP suits”—
i.e., as discussed in more detail below—investment of thousands of 
dollars to suppress negative press is often a profitable investment in 
the long term. 
Statistically, most SLAPP defendants prevail, but only after an 
average of thirty-six months in the litigation process.15 Savvy filers 
can leverage their expertise with the legal system to strategically 
extend the process. Thus, even with a favorable dismissal of the suit, 
the legal fees can cost more than $20,000.16 And simply seeking a high 
damage award can create multidimensional problems for the SLAPP 
target; for instance, defendants “can face bankruptcy, loss of credit, 
and foreclosure” in contesting such frivolous suits.17 
SLAPP suits also produce a significant social cost. SLAPP suits, 
by their very nature, aim to chill debate on important public and 
political issues. SLAPP suits attempt to decrease public participation 
and suppress the speech of those who may raise valid concerns—
which thus routinely imperils the free speech rights of news 
organizations and related entities that occupy a crucial watchdog role 
in democracies.18 Ripple effects of SLAPP suits also are far-reaching, 
as the broader organizations involved in SLAPP suits can see 
decreased membership and participation, resulting in such 
organizations becoming defunct or disbanded.19 
 
 14. Victor J. Cosentino, Comment, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: An 
Analysis of the Solutions, 27 CAL. W. L. REV. 399, 410 (1991). 
 15. Canan, supra note 6, at 26. 
 16. Ericson-Siegel, supra note 1, at 494. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Ralph Michael Stein, SLAPP Suits: A Slap at the First Amendment, 7 PACE ENV’T L. REV. 
45, 53 (1989). 
 19. Id.; see also Canan, supra note 6, at 29 (explaining that three homeowners’ groups “fell 
apart” as members “withdrew from the organizations, afraid that they would be swept under 
$40,150,000 worth of liability”); Robert H. Boyle, Activists at Risk of Being SLAPPed, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 25, 1991, at 6, 7–8 (quoting Victor Monia regarding a SLAPP suit brought by 
Parnas Corporation against the West Valley Taxpayers and Environmentalists Association: “We 
had had a very active organization with 550 homeowners . . . . The year after the suit . . . . 
[m]embership had dropped to 100, and by the second year of the suit, it was really only the board 
of directors and hard-core folks, about 25 of us, who were left.”). 
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A.  “Eco-SLAPP” Litigation 
Eco-SLAPP litigation emerged in the early 1970s to oppose the 
rising environmental movement.20 Eco-SLAPP litigation follows a 
formulaic pattern: environmentalists initially petition the government 
and/or news agencies or bring specific environmental concerns to the 
public’s attention.21 Thereafter, the opposing party sues these 
environmentalists or news agencies for monetary damages based on 
defamation or tortious interference with contract.22 These eco-SLAPP 
suits usually have two goals in mind. First, such suits can result in real 
monetary hardship for defendants.23 Second, eco-SLAPP suits can 
produce a chilling effect on free speech—as news agencies or 
concerned individuals will refrain, in the future, from bringing such 
matters of environmental concern to the broad public’s attention due 
to fear of legal retribution.24 
Many eco-SLAPP suits, however, prove unsuccessful on the 
substantive merits. For instance, in Sierra Club v. Butz,25 a U.S. 
District Court dismissed the counterclaim and stated:  
[T]he First Amendment provision guaranteeing the right of 
the people to petition the government for a redress . . . . is a 
basic freedom in a participatory government . . . these are the 
“indispensable democratic freedoms” that cannot be 
abridged if a government is to continue to reflect the desires 
of the people.26  
But libel and defamation actions are notoriously expensive and 
difficult to defend.27 Furthermore, the mere threat of being put in 
defense of a lawsuit may chill the exercise of First Amendment 
 
 20. GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT 
84 (1996). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See generally id. at 83–104 (stating numerous opposing parties who sought monetary 
damages based on defamation or tortious interference with contract). 
 23. As representative examples, in Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y. 
1991), Dr. Moor-Jankowski spent more than $1 million and seven years defending a SLAPP suit; 
and in Hodgins Kennels, Inc. v. Durbin, 429 N.W.2d 189 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988), rev’d in part, 438 
N.W. 2d 247 (Mich. 1989) (mem.), five animal welfare advocates in Michigan settled for over 
$800,000 and spent nine years in court, whereas the kennel owners were awarded $329,739 in 
damages. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 20, at 100–03. 
 24. Canan, supra note 6, at 30. 
 25. 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972). 
 26. Id. at 936. 
 27. Lee Levine & Stephen Wermiel, Behind the U.S. Reports: Justice Brennan’s Unpublished 
Opinions and Memoranda in New York Times v. Sullivan and Its Progeny, 19 COMMC’N L. & 
POL’Y 227, 246 (2014). 
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freedoms.28 Consequently, there is legitimate concern that eco-SLAPP 
suits are improperly wielded by such powerful actors to harass and 
coerce their targets, and thus such suits are deeply problematic from a 
public policy standpoint. 
B.  SLAPP Suits Against the Media 
Frivolous lawsuits directed towards media outlets are a second 
subcategory of SLAPP suit.29 These suits increasingly are gaining 
public prominence as President Trump continues to threaten the press, 
focusing expressly on news organizations.30 There are two different 
funding models for SLAPP suits directed against the media: (1) direct 
litigation—wherein well-capitalized entities (e.g., billionaires) sue 
news organization directly; and (2) indirect litigation—wherein such 
powerful entities set up funds for the broader purpose of defraying 
litigation costs for any parties seeking to sue news organizations.31 
Indirect funding for litigation constitutes a particularly egregious 
mechanism when effectuated covertly—i.e., as such tactics enhance 
the chilling effect of lawsuits. That is, covert third-party funding often 
has an ultimate goal of achieving censorship of the target and not of 
legitimate compensation for alleged tortfeasor harms.32 Accordingly, 
if a suit is funded by a third party with improper censorship 
motivations, then such bad-faith actors might “embrace economically 
questionable scorched-earth litigation tactics or refuse reasonable 
settlements in order to increase the costs of publication.”33 This type 
of litigation may intimidate publishers and news organizations to 
avoid publishing “liberal” messages as opposed to “conservative” 
articles due to distorted litigation costs.34 Ultimately, then, such 
mechanisms can greatly compromise freedoms of speech and of the 
 
 28. Stein, supra note 18, at 53. 
 29. See generally Lili Levi, The Weaponized Lawsuit Against the Media: Litigation Funding 
as a New Threat to Journalism, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 761 (2017) (discussing SLAPP suits brought 
against media and its effects). 
 30. Justin Wise, Trump Escalates Fight Against Press with Libel Lawsuits, THE HILL (Mar. 8, 
2020, 6:02 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/media/486273-trump-escalates-fight-against-
press-with-libel-lawsuits. 
 31. Levi, supra note 29, at 763–64 n.4. 
 32. Id. at 782–83. 
 33. Id. at 785. 
 34. Id. at 785–86. 
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press—which, of course, implicate core democratic-constitutional 
principles.35 
II.  CASE STUDY: ROBERT MURRAY AND MURRAY ENERGY 
Murray Energy has been characterized as the largest privately 
owned coal corporation in the nation.36 Murray claims to operate 
seventeen mines in the United States and Colombia with 
approximately seven thousand employees.37 Throughout the time 
period of pertinent litigation, Murray Energy’s chairman, president, 
and chief executive officer (CEO) was Robert E. Murray.38 Over the 
years, Murray Energy and its CEO very publicly voiced opposition or 
support for various energy policies, depending on the shifting politics 
of presidential administrations.39 
 
 35. Id. at 784–85. 
 36. Broghan Swart, Is Murray Energy the Nation’s Largest Coal Company?, POLITIFACT 
(Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.politifact.com/west-virginia/statements/2019/nov/08/joe-manchin/ 
murray-energy-nations-largest-coal-company/. Note that like numerous other coal corporations in 
the prior decade, Murray Energy filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in October 2019. See, e.g., Pippa 
Stevens, Murray Energy Joins Growing List of Coal Companies to Declare Bankruptcy, CNBC 
(Oct. 29, 2019, 9:17 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/29/murray-energy-joins-list-of-coal-
companies-to-declare-bankruptcy.html. Despite this recent bankruptcy filing, Murray Energy 
nevertheless constitutes an exceedingly useful case model for this Article due to both (1) Murray’s 
decades-long litigation pattern involving “cookie-cutter” complaints and court dismissals, and (2) 
the acute national attention given to Murray’s misconduct in very recent years. 
 37. Corporate Overview, MURRAY ENERGY CORP., http://www.murrayenergycorp.com/ 
corporate-overview/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2020) [https://web.archive.org/web/20200828183821/ 
http://www.murrayenergycorp.com/corporate-overview/] [hereinafter Murray Corporate 
Overview]. 
 38. Robert E. Murray, A Message from Our Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer, 
MURRAY ENERGY CORP., http://www.murrayenergycorp.com/message-from-the-founder-ceo/ 
(last visited Nov. 22, 2020) [https://web.archive.org/web/20180328145108/http://www.murrayen
ergycorp.com/message-from-the-founder-ceo/]. 
 39. Lisa Friedman, How a Coal Baron’s Wish List Became Trump’s To-Do List, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 9, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2ErSbf0; see also Murray, supra note 38 (“[O]ur industry is 
embattled from excessive federal government regulations from the Obama Administration and by 
the increased use of natural gas for the generation of electricity.”); Matthew Kazin, Murray Energy 
CEO on What’s Smothering the Coal Industry, FOXBUSINESS (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.foxbu
siness.com/politics/murray-energy-ceo-on-whats-smothering-the-coal-industry (quoting Robert E. 
Murray as blaming the coal industry’s decline on “the Obama Administration and the Democrat 
Party and the Democrats in Washington D.C.” and commenting that Ted Cruz was his favored 
candidate in the 2016 presidential race because he “has shown concern about low-cost electricity”); 
More Obama-Era Coal Rules Should be Rolled Back: Murray Energy CEO, FOXBUSINESS 
(July 20, 2018), https://www.foxbusiness.com/energy/more-obama-era-coal-rules-should-be-
rolled-back-murray-energy-ceo (quoting Robert E. Murray praising the Trump Administration for 
easing energy regulations and urging President Trump to do more to prevent coal-fired plants from 
closing). 
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On June 21, 2017, Murray Energy and Robert Murray as its CEO 
sued television host and comedian John Oliver for defamation in a 
West Virginia court, after Oliver aired a segment critical of Murray 
and his corporation.40 The Oliver case was dismissed from circuit 
court less than a year later.41 A few months prior to the Oliver suit, 
Murray Energy had, in fact, sued the New York Times for defamation 
in the same West Virginia court.42 And both suits occurred within a 
much broader context spanning two decades wherein Murray filed a 
series of lawsuits against media and individual citizens critical of 
Murray enterprises.43 
As West Virginia, like many jurisdictions, lacks anti-SLAPP 
legislation—i.e., unpacked at length below—courts should utilize 
common law doctrine regarding free speech and their sanctioning 
powers under Rule 11 to combat bad-faith actors that systematically 
file frivolous lawsuits to curtail public debate.44 As the American Civil 
 
 40. See Complaint at 1, Marshall Cnty. Coal Co. v. Oliver, No. 17-C-124 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. 
June 21, 2017) [hereinafter Oliver Complaint]; Kevin Lui, Coal Boss Robert Murray Is Suing John 
Oliver After Being Mocked on Last Week Tonight, TIME (June 23, 2017, 9:28 AM), 
http://time.com/4829720/john-oliver-lawsuit-robert-murray-coal/. 
 41. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss 
for Failure to State a Claim at 1, 27–28, Marshall Cnty. Coal Co. v. Oliver, No. 17-C-124 (W. Va. 
Cir. Ct. Mar. 15, 2018) [hereinafter Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Oliver Complaint]. 
 42. See Complaint at 1, Marshall Cnty. Coal Co. v. The N.Y. Times Co., No. 17-C-70 (W. Va. 
Cir. Ct. May 3, 2017) [hereinafter The N.Y. Times Complaint]. 
 43. See infra Table 1. 
 44. S.B. 698, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2007) (introduced version), 
http://www.wvlegislature.gov/bill_status/bills_text.cfm?billdoc=sb698%20intr.htm&yr=2007&se
sstype=RS&i=698. The bill, titled the “Anti-SLAPP Actions Act,” was introduced February 19, 
2007, and sponsored by Senator Unger with no other sponsors. It was referred to the Committee on 
the Judiciary but died in Committee. See Bill Status—2007 Regular Session: Senate Bill 698, W. 
VA. LEG., http://www.wvlegislature.gov/bill_status/bills_history.cfm?year=2007&sessiontype=R
S&input=698 (last visited Nov. 22, 2020); see generally Pushinsky v. W. Va. Bd. of L. Exam’rs, 
266 S.E.2d 444, 449 (W. Va. 1980) (concluding that the West Virginia Constitution’s limitations 
on the power of the government to inquire about associations and speech is more stringent than the 
federal Constitution); Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28, 37 (W. Va. 1981) (finding an absolute privilege 
for free speech regarding matters of a public concern in the context of an environmental group 
speaking out about violations of a coal company), overruled by Harris v. Adkins, 432 S.E.2d 549 
(W. Va. 1993); Woodruff v. Bd. of Trs. of Cabell Huntington Hosp., 319 S.E.2d 372, 379 (W. Va. 
1984) (regarding whether a collective bargaining agreement could waive the rights of the workers 
from picketing; deciding that the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights under the West 
Virginia state constitution “is more stringent . . . than is the federal constitution”); Long v. Egnor, 
346 S.E.2d 778, 782 (W. Va. 1986) (granting a writ of prohibition where an action was filed against 
the West Virginia Educational Association and its employee by individuals of the Cabell County 
Board of Education for allegations in a memorandum alleging harassment and coercion because of 
the risk of chilling effects should the case proceed); State ex rel. Suriano v. Gaughan, 480 S.E.2d 
548, 565 (W. Va. 1996) (granting a writ of prohibition to stop the proceedings of a libel suit against 
the Ohio County Education Association and its former president after publications and 
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Liberties Union of West Virginia succinctly outlines in its amicus 
curiae brief in the Oliver case, the lawsuit was baseless, Murray 
Energy and its CEO have a history of filing such speech-chilling cases, 
and it is within the power of the court to issue Rule 11 sanctions 
against plaintiffs for such a clear abuse of litigation and to deter similar 
conduct in the future.45 We concur with such arguments: when the 
object is not to prevail on the merits, but rather to merely silence 
opponents, such bad-faith actors must receive adequate punishment. 
This is required from the standpoint of sound public policy and in the 
interests of maintaining core democratic-constitutional values.46 
A.  The John Oliver Defamation Case 
On June 18, 2017, the late-night news satire program “Last Week 
Tonight” aired an HBO segment on the coal industry critical of Robert 
Murray and Murray Energy—specifically regarding their role in 
degrading coal-mining safety.47 Prior to the segment’s air date, 
Murray’s attorneys sent a cease-and-desist letter warning the show and 
its host that if aired, litigation would ensue.48 On June 21, 2017, 
Murray Energy, certain Murray Energy subsidiaries,49 and Robert 
Murray filed a lengthy defamation lawsuit against John Oliver, 
Charles Wilson, Partially Important Productions, LLC, Home Box 
Office, Inc., Time Warner, Inc., and Does 1 through 10 in reaction to 
the airing of the segment and its subsequent YouTube posting.50 The 
tort claims included defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.51 Requested relief included 
general damages, special damages, punitive damages, attorney’s fees 
 
advertisements in the Wheeling Register named healthcare providers withdrawing from certain state 
insurance programs); Harris v. Adkins, 432 S.E.2d 549, 552 (W. Va. 1993) (holding that the right 
to petition the government in connection with an issue of public interest is entitled to heightened 
protection); see also infra Table 1. 
 45. Proposed Amended Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union of West 
Virginia Foundation in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and in 
Support of Dismissal and Rule 11 Sanctions at 1–2, 10, Marshall Cnty. Coal Co. v. Oliver, No. 17-
CV-99 (N.D. W. Va. Aug. 2, 2017) [hereinafter ACLU Amicus Curiae Brief]. 
 46. Cosentino, supra note 14, at 402–03. 
 47. Lui, supra note 40. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Specifically, Marshall County Coal Company, The Marion County Coal Company, The 
Monongalia County Coal Company, The Harrison County Coal Company, and The Ohio County 
Coal Company. See Oliver Complaint, supra note 40, at 1. 
 50. See generally id. at 17 (indicating the subsequent posting of the episode on YouTube). 
 51. See generally id. at 17, 19, 21 (stating all the causes of action brought by plaintiffs). 
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and costs of suit, and, importantly, a permanent injunction 
“prohibiting rebroadcast of the Defamatory Statements and requiring 
the removal of the Defamatory Statements from public access.”52 
The West Virginia circuit court advised that it would grant the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint.53 Accordingly, the 
circuit court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim, dismissing the complaint on March 15, 2018.54 The final 
order was entered on April 4, 2018.55 The plaintiffs appealed the 
decision to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals on April 13, 
2018.56 
This litigation exhibits the classic anatomy of a SLAPP suit: a 
powerful entity sued a target for claims such as defamation and false 
light in clear retaliation for critical speech in an attempt to silence that 
party—which quite literally involved, in this case, a request to prohibit 
the segment’s rebroadcast.57 However, the anatomy of this specific 
case is not the only factor we can weigh in ultimately classifying it as 
a SLAPP suit. That is, the Oliver litigation is merely one of a series of 
cases filed by Murray Energy, pertinent subsidiaries, and Robert 
Murray as Murray Energy’s CEO in the past two decades involving 
similar claims against the media, individual citizens, and union 
officials that have spoken or published critical information about 
Murray enterprises—i.e., with a majority of those cases being 
dismissed at the same stage of the proceeding.58 
As one significant and foundational example, a court previously 
chastised Murray for filing “virtually identical” complaints.59 In the 
2002 Murray v. Tarley60 case, Murray sued the Secretary-Treasurer of 
the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) for “malicious 
defamation arising from allegedly false and defamatory public 
 
 52. See generally id. at 22–23 (indicating all relief sought by the plaintiffs). 
 53. Letter from Hon. Jeffrey D. Cramer, C.J., Second Judicial Circuit, to Counsel (Feb. 21, 
2018), http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-
content/uploads/sites/16/case-documents/2018/20180221_docket-17-C-124_letter.pdf. 
 54. See Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Oliver Complaint, supra note 41, at 1–2. 
 55. See Docket Entries, Final Order Entered, Marshall Cnty. Coal Co. v. Oliver, No. 17-C-
124 (Apr. 4, 2018). 
 56. See Docket Entries, Notice of Appeal (Supreme Court of Appeals of WV.) and Its 
Attachments, Marshall Cnty. Coal Co. v. Oliver, No. 17-C-124 (Apr. 13, 2018). 
 57. See generally Oliver Complaint, supra note 40 (epitomizing the general anatomy of a 
SLAPP suit). 
 58. See infra Table 2; ACLU Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 45, at 1–2. 
 59. Murray v. Tarley, No. C2-01-693, 2002 WL 484537, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 21, 2002). 
 60. No. C2-01-693, 2002 WL 484537 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 21, 2002). 
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statements . . . in three press releases and at a public rally” during the 
course of collective bargaining agreements between the UMWA 
representing the miners at the Powhatan No. 6 Mine and the 
company.61 The court raised the issue of res judicata sua sponte 
because plaintiffs sued the same party for an identical action in the 
Federal District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.62 In 
this case, just one month previously, in January 2002, the court 
dismissed it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 12(b)(1).63 
The court noted that the “Amended Complaints in each case are 
virtually identical.”64 
Taken as a whole, then, the most appropriate classification for the 
Oliver case is that of a SLAPP suit whose aims are to impede 
constitutional free speech rights. This assertion is not only supported 
by the complaint itself, but also by the fact that these suits were routine 
for Murray Energy and Robert Murray as its CEO over the course of 
two decades—i.e., as illustrated by yet more examples discussed 
below beyond Tarley and detailed in the two Tables appended to this 
Article.65 Here, we are concerned with an abuse of litigation by 
Murray for the clear purpose of chilling free speech, which indeed 
arises when a party exhibits a pattern of frivolous lawsuits filed with 
complaints of strikingly similar construction year after year.66 Despite 
case dismissal or settlement in many instances, the chilling of speech 
still occurs, thereby achieving the actual purpose of the lawsuit—and 
not success of the case on the substantive merits.67 
 
 61. Id. at *1. 
 62. Id. at *8. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at *9. 
 65. See infra Table 1 and Table 2; ACLU Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 45, at 1–2. 
 66. In its amicus brief, the American Civil Liberties Union of West Virginia points out the 
repeated filings of Murray over the past two decades, as well as the role of Rule 11 in deterring 
future abuse. See ACLU Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 45, at 5–6, 14. See generally Marshall 
Cnty. Coal Co. v. Oliver, No. 5:17-CV-99, 2017 WL 10436072 (N.D. W. Va. Aug. 10, 2017). 
 67. In our present case study, cases dismissed at the 12(b)(6) stage include Murray v. Moyers, 
No. 2:14-CV-02334, 2015 WL 5626509 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 24, 2015) (defamation claim dismissed); 
Murray v. HuffingtonPost.com, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 3d 879 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (defamation action 
dismissed); Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Oliver Complaint, supra note 41, at 1–2 (defamation 
action dismissed); Tarley, 2002 WL 484537, at *1 (defamation action dismissed); Murray Energy 
Holdings Co. v. Bloomberg, L.P., No. 2:15-CV-2845, 2016 WL 3355456 (S.D. Ohio June 17, 
2016) (defamation claim dismissed). Cases dismissed at the summary judgment stage include 
Chagrin; however, there was still a retraction of the article at issue. Murray v. Chagrin Valley 
Publ’g Co., 25 N.E.3d 1111 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014) (dismissal affirmed); see infra Table 2; see also 
ACLU Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 45, at 1–2. And the Knight-Ridder case had a reversal of 
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B.  A Pattern and Practice: A Comparison of Complaints 
Lawsuits with similar causes of action will logically bear some 
resemblance; nevertheless, the degree to which Murray Energy and its 
subsidiaries’ complaints resemble and indeed copy one another is 
striking and cause for concern from a public policy standpoint.68 As 
Victor Cosentino argues, there can be a great deal of difficulty in 
distinguishing a SLAPP suit from “legitimate tort cases” because the 
causes of action are generally torts.69 Hence, he recognizes the need to 
closely investigate the “motive in suing.”70 
Based on our close examination, however, the motive of Murray 
Energy and related parties is clear: to chill the constitutionally 
protected free speech of critics. In a general sense, Murray Energy’s 
filing of practically identical complaints in two different jurisdictions 
in the early 2000s foreshadowed the appearance of “cut and paste” 
complaints filed in the years to come against various reporters, 
newspapers, broadcasting companies, bloggers, cartoonists, and a 
television host.71 Six complaints filed by Murray Energy, its CEO, or 
one of the subsidiaries had multiple paragraphs that were either 
identical or nearly identical.72 Granted, some counts, by their very 
nature, will be similar, and the facts examined are not identical.73 
Nevertheless, because the Murray complaints contain such 
similar language—as combined with the causes of action deployed, 
the targets of the litigation, the frequency in which the cases were 
filed, and their ultimate dismissals—our case study reveals that the 
suits were brought for an improper, frivolous purpose: to 
unconstitutionally suppress critics speaking out on matters of great 
public concern.74 And as we argue in more detail below, under Rule 
 
summary judgment, settlement, and a retraction of article. Murray v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., No. 02 
BE 45, 2004 WL 333250 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2004) (defamation action dismissed). 
 68. See infra Table 2. 
 69. Cosentino, supra note 14, at 401–02. 
 70. Id. at 401. 
 71. See Tarley, 2002 WL 484537, at *9; infra Table 1. 
 72. See infra Table 1. 
 73. See infra Table 1. 
 74. Pring and Canan list the typical claims signaling a potential SLAPP as follows: 
1. Defamation (libel, slander, etc.); 2. Business torts (interference with business, 
economic expectancy, contract, etc.; product disparagement, and antitrust or restraint of 
trade); 3. Judicial-administrative torts (malicious prosecution, abuse of process); 4. 
Conspiracy (to commit any of these torts); 5. Constitutional and civil rights violations 
(chiefly “taking” of filer’s property and unlawful “discrimination” against filer); and 6. 
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11 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure and controlling West 
Virginia case law, imposition of sanctions is appropriate when there 
has been a pattern of improper practice within a lawsuit by a party or 
attorney.75 
C.  Silencing the Media 
In select cases involving Murray Energy, media outlets were 
unwilling to risk litigation, most likely due to the high costs of 
litigation and to concerns regarding high damages sought. 
Additionally, some activist groups have settled with Murray to avoid 
delays in their mission potentially associated with prolonged 
litigation. In these cases, Murray succeeded in silencing key voices in 
public discourse, while also sending a clear chilling message to all 
 
Miscellaneous wrong (including nuisance, invasion of privacy, attack on nonprofit tax 
status, etc.). 
George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation” 
(“SLAPPs”): An Introduction for Bench, Bar and Bystanders, 12 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 937, 947 
(1992). They go on to list “six broad dispute areas”: “1. Real estate development and zoning; 2. 
Criticism of public officials and employees; 3. Environmental protection and animal rights; 4. Civil 
rights (race, gender, employment, and other forms of discrimination); 5. Neighborhood problems 
(frequently characterized as the ‘Not In My Back Yard’ or ‘NIMBY’ syndrome); and 6. Consumer 
issues.” Id. Further, their early study showed that most SLAPPs were dismissed. Id. at 944. 
 75. W. VA. CODE. ANN. R. 11 (LexisNexis 2021): 
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, 
submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, and attorney 
or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person’s knowledge, 
information, and belief formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,  
  (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;  
  (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing 
law or by a non frivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law or the establishment of new law;  
  (3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, of 
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable 
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and  
  (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically 
so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief. 
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court 
determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions 
state below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that 
have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation. 
Considerations for the imposition of sanctions under West Virginia law were established under 
Bartles v. Hinkle: “[T]o determine what will constitute an appropriate sanction, a court may 
consider the seriousness of the conduct, the impact the conduct had in the case and in the 
administration of justice, any mitigating circumstances, and whether the conduct was an isolated 
occurrence or was a pattern of wrongdoing throughout the case.” Bartles v. Hinkle, 472 S.E.2d 827, 
836 (W. Va. 1996). 
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potential future media outlets who may seek to publish critical 
analyses of Murray. 
As a prime example, following a mine accident of Murray Energy 
in Utah, the publication Coal Age ran a critical editorial about 
Murray’s subsequent press conference. After Murray threated to sue 
Steve Fiscor, editor of Coal Age and of Engineering & Mining 
Journal, the journal issued an apology to Murray for the editorial.76 
As another example, Robert Murray sued a Washington, D.C. based 
advocacy group, Public Citizen, for radio ads attacking him.77 Public 
Citizen settled with Murray and paid $7,500 for the legal costs of 
removing the lawsuit from federal to state court.78 As yet another 
example, in 2001, Murray sued Margaret Newkirk, a former reporter 
for the Akron Beacon Journal, after she wrote an article profiling 
Murray and his status in the coal industry.79 The newspaper and 
Murray reached a settlement involving the Beacon issuing what 
Murray called a “retraction”—as the Beacon published an article 
stating that the prior editorial contained material “from which a reader 
could have drawn incorrect conclusions” about Murray, and that the 
paper “regrets any harm to [Murray], his family or his business.”80 
Interestingly, one news article relayed that “[a]s far as Mr. Murray is 
concerned, any payment is an admission of guilt and an indication that 
in this lawsuit, Murray Energy has won.”81 
III.  BREAKING THE PATTERN 
A.  Anti-SLAPP Statutes 
The court in one Murray suit examined in this case study, Murray 
v. Chagrin Valley Publishing Co.,82 called for the Ohio legislature to 
 
 76. Anya Litvak, Coal Company Owner on a Mission to Save His Industry, PITTSBURGH 
POST-GAZETTE (Oct. 10, 2015, 9:00 PM), https://www.post-
gazette.com/business/powersource/2015/10/11/Murray-Energy-owner-Robert-Murray-on-a-
mission-to-save-his-industry/stories/201510110111; Jonathan Peters, A Coal Magnate’s Latest 
Lawsuit Was Tossed—but Ohio Can Do More to Defend Free Expression, COLUM. JOURNALISM 
REV. (May 28, 2014), https://archives.cjr.org/united_states_project/murray_energy_defamation_l
awsuits_huffington_post.php. 
 77. Litvak, supra note 76. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Peters, supra note 76. 
 80. See id. (alteration in original). 
 81. Litvak, supra note 76. 
 82. 25 N.E.3d 1111 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014). 
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enact an anti-SLAPP statute after review of the case.83 And earlier that 
year, American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Ohio attorney, 
Jonathan Peters, authored an article in the Columbia Journalism 
Review detailing the history of Murray Energy and its CEO’s penchant 
for filing lawsuits against the press and argued for Ohio to adopt anti-
SLAPP legislation.84 At the time of this writing, approximately six 
years later, twenty-nine states have anti-SLAPP legislation on the 
books; however, Ohio is not one of them.85 
Several states have attempted to combat SLAPP suits by 
fashioning special remedies available to litigation targets. Some 
statutory remedies will apply only after defendants have concluded 
litigation; these solutions therefore offer incomplete relief because the 
SLAPP filer might have already achieved the goal of disrupting the 
target’s protected First Amendment speech and chilling future free 
speech efforts.86 Select states have directly addressed this issue by 
formulating statutory remedies to help facilitate a quick resolution to 
SLAPP litigation.87 For instance, in New York, the trial court can 
dismiss an alleged SLAPP suit unless the filer can show that the 
lawsuit has “a substantial basis in law or is supported by a substantial 
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.”88 
Similarly, Maine courts have created a “special motion to dismiss” 
which allows a trial court to grant early dismissal unless the SLAPP 
filer can show that the target’s activities were without a reasonable 
basis in law or fact, and that those activities led to actual injury.89 
Unfortunately, early dismissal and cost-shifting remedies address 
only an immediate SLAPP suit—and not instances where a party 
exhibits a clear pattern of such suits. When a plaintiff is a habitual 
SLAPP filer, such has been the case with Murray enterprises, then a 
different remedy must be fashioned. 
 
 83. Id. at 1124–25. 
 84. See Peters, supra note 76. 
 85. Anti-SLAPP Statutes and Commentary, MEDIA L. RES. CTR., 
http://www.medialaw.org/topics-page/anti-slapp (last visited Nov. 22, 2020). 
 86. Johnston, supra note 2, at 279. 
 87. Id. 
 88. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(g) (MCKINNEY 2020); see also Johnston, supra note 2, at 279 
(explaining that section 3211(g) provides a “more immediate remedy” than statutory schemes that 
“apply only after the target has been subjected to a considerable course of litigation”). 
 89. ME. STAT. tit. 14, § 556 (2019); see also Johnston, supra note 2, at 280 (“[A] SLAPP 
target in Maine may bring a ‘special motion to dismiss.’ The trial court will grant the motion unless 
the SLAPP filer can show that the target’s public participation activities were without a reasonable 
basis in fact or law, and that those activities led to actual injury.”). 
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B.  West Virginia and the Absence of Anti-SLAPP Legislation 
West Virginia currently lacks anti-SLAPP legislation, despite 
introduction of an anti-SLAPP bill in the past.90 In 2016, a new study 
committee was appointed to consider “the need for and feasibility of” 
an anti-SLAPP Act by the West Virginia Commission on Uniform 
State Laws, which was to report its findings to the West Virginia 
legislature.91 And recall also that in the context of our case study, two 
2017 actions were filed in West Virginia by Murray—one against the 
New York Times and the other against Oliver and other defendants.92 
Note that, significantly, curtailing SLAPP suits in West Virginia 
comports with the state’s legacy of protecting a citizen’s constitutional 
free speech rights.93 While West Virginia lacks anti-SLAPP 
legislation to date, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has 
always been protective of the chilling effects of SLAPP suit 
litigation.94 If a lawsuit interferes with a citizen’s right to free speech 
with “insufficient allegations,” the case cannot proceed to trial if the 
remedy sought “is manifestly inadequate to protect against the chilling 
effect of allowing a suit to proceed.”95 And notably, West Virginia’s 
Constitution is “more stringent” in its free speech protections than the 
national Constitution.96 
 
 90. See sources cited supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 91. W. VA. COMM’N ON UNIF. STATE L., REPORT TO THE WEST VIRGINIA LEGISLATURE 
REGULAR SESSION 2017, at 8 (2017), http://www.wvlegislature.gov/legisdocs/reports/agency/C0
6_FY_2017_13670.pdf. 
 92. See The N.Y. Times Complaint, supra note 42, at 1; Oliver Complaint, supra note 40, at 
1. 
 93. See sources cited supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 94. See generally Pushinsky v. W. Va. Bd. of L. Exam’rs, 266 S.E.2d 444 (W. Va. 1980) 
(explaining that West Virginia’s Constitution imposes limits the state’s power “to inquire into 
lawful associations and speech more stringent than those imposed on the states by the Constitution 
of the United States”); Woodruff v. Bd. of Trs. of Cabell Huntington Hosp., 319 S.E.2d 372, 379 
(W. Va. 1984) (holding that public sector employees cannot waive by contract their constitutionally 
protected speech guarantees, and collective bargaining agreements that abrogate these fundamental 
rights are void under the West Virginia Constitution); State ex rel. Suriano v. Gaughan, 480 S.E.2d 
548, 565 (W. Va. 1996) (stating that participants in public debate “must steel themselves to harsh 
criticism that does not exceed the actual malice privilege” mandated by both the United States 
Constitution and West Virginia’s Constitution). 
 95. Suriano, 480 S.E.2d at 551, 554. As the court notes, “[p]rohibition will lie to prohibit a 
case from proceeding to trial when the remedy of appeal is manifestly inadequate to protect against 
the chilling effect of allowing a suit to proceed because the complaint, as a matter of constitutional 
law, contains insufficient allegations to warrant interference.” Id. at 551 (quoting Long v. Egnor, 
346 S.E.2d 778, 779–80 (W.Va. 1986)). 
 96. See sources cited supra note 44 and accompanying text. The West Virginia State 
Constitution reads in pertinent part: 
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Harris v. Adkins97 is the leading case regarding SLAPP suits in 
West Virginia, and it stands on the shoulders of Webb v. Fury.98 Webb 
was, in fact, one of the most powerfully worded opinions in the nation 
regarding the importance of protecting free speech from the chilling 
effect of frivolous litigation; Webb was handed down in the context of 
SLAPP suits gaining traction in the courts in the 1970s and 1980s.99 
In 1981, before the articulation of the “SLAPP” suit per se by 
commentators Penelope Canan and George Pring,100 the West Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals argued in Webb that the “cost to society in 
terms of the threat to our liberty and freedom is beyond calculation” 
with regard to deciding whether to allow a defamation lawsuit by a 
coal company against a citizen critical of that company to proceed in 
court.101 Furthermore, the court stated that “[s]urface mining, and 
energy development generally, are matters of great public concern,” 
and that vigorous debate and the free exchange of ideas are the 
“adhesive of our democracy.”102 
More specifically, in Webb, a community organizer was sued 
under a defamation claim for filing citizen complaints against the 
DLM Coal Corporation for violations related to mining practices and 
for circulating a newsletter describing mining impacts on streams in 
Upshur County, West Virginia.103 DLM sued Webb and 
environmental groups for, among other things, libel as a result of the 
publication and circulation of the newsletter.104 Webb filed a writ of 
 
No law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, shall be passed; but the 
Legislature may, by suitable penalties, restrain the publication or sale of obscene books, 
papers, or pictures, and provide for the punishment of libel, and defamation of character, 
and for the recovery, in civil actions, by the aggrieved party, of suitable damages for 
such libel, or defamation. 
 W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 7. 
 97. 432 S.E.2d 549 (W. Va. 1993). 
 98. 282 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1981), overruled by Harris v. Adkins, 432 S.E.2d 549 (W. Va. 
1993). The issue in Webb was whether the defendant in the matter had absolute immunity in 
petitioning the government under the West Virginia State Constitution, article III, section 16, 
allowing for a writ of prohibition. Id. at 30–31, 34–35 The court held in the affirmative. Id. at 43. 
Harris v. Adkins overruled Webb to the extent that there was absolute immunity under the West 
Virginia State Constitution, article III, section 16, changing the standard from absolute immunity 
to actual malice as articulated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. Harris, 432 S.E.2d at 550 (citing 
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)). 
 99. Pring & Canan, supra note 74, at 940, 943. 
 100. Pring, supra note 5, at 3–4. 
 101. Webb, 282 S.E.2d at 30–31, 43. 
 102. Id. at 43. 
 103. Id. at 31. 
 104. Id. 
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prohibition asserting that under the West Virginia Constitution, the 
lawsuit must be terminated because he had absolute immunity in his 
action of petitioning government.105 After applying the Noer-
Pennington doctrine, the court in Webb agreed.106 The Court argued 
that speech on matters of great public concern definitively belongs 
outside of the courthouse—as it is necessary to maintain a 
democracy.107 
Despite the Webb court being concerned with a citizen’s right to 
petition the government, “its primary concern was the chilling effect 
of litigation on a citizen who was exercising a sensitive constitutional 
right, which was at the heart of the litigation.”108 The fact that there is 
no absolute immunity does not diminish this line of reasoning; what is 
more, the “actual malice” standard established in New York Times, Co. 
v. Sullivan109 functions as a powerful preventative measure against 
potentially frivolous litigation.110 Ultimately, then, West Virginia’s 
robust history of protecting citizens from the chilling effect of 
frivolous litigation supports the argument that SLAPP suits should be 
curtailed. 
The dissent in Webb argued that the court’s approach was too 
broad, and the opinion was, in fact, partially overturned a decade later, 
aligning the “actual malice” standard with New York Times v. 
Sullivan.111 Justice Neely proposed a three-stage test for these types of 
lawsuits.112 First, the test requires a prima facie showing if the plaintiff 
seeks damages or an injunction; second, a preliminary hearing at the 
early stages of the case is required to determine if the suit is reasonable 
and brought in good faith; and third, the test requires that the plaintiff 
pay full costs to the defendant if the case goes to trial but loses on the 
substantive merits.113 On the third factor, Justice Neely proposes that 
if, after the trial, “it becomes apparent that the plaintiff actually was 
using the legal process . . . to oppress citizens who have legitimately 
exercised first amendment rights, then the courts should exercise their 
 
 105. Id. at 30–31, 34. 
 106. Id. at 34, 37, 42. 
 107. Id. at 43. 
 108. Long v. Egnor, 346 S.E.2d 778, 781 (W. Va. 1986) (discussing Webb). 
 109. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 110. Id. at 280.  
 111. See Webb, 282 S.E.2d at 43–44 (Neely, J., dissenting); Harris v. Adkins, 432 S.E.2d 549, 
552 (W. Va. 1993). 
 112. Webb, 282 S.E.2d at 47. 
 113. Id. 
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equitable powers to impose costs against the plaintiff in excess of the 
actual costs of defending the case.”114 Note, however, that while 
Justice Neely’s proposed test focuses on the imposition of costs on 
bad-faith filers, we instead contend below that non-monetary attorney 
sanctions ultimately would constitute a more effective deterrent. 
Justice Neely’s dissent thus recognizes the need for enhanced 
mechanisms to protect courts from abusive litigation practices and to 
safeguard constitutionally protected free speech.115 Specifically, 
Justice Neely states that “[t]he potential for chilling legitimate first 
amendment rights when there is anything less than absolute immunity 
is awe inspiring. The key to solving this dilemma is finding a device 
which will screen legitimate first amendment activity from 
irresponsible or sham first amendment activity.”116 
The subsequent failure of the West Virginia legislature to enact 
anti-SLAPP legislation despite its introduction and consideration 
therefore has left defendants without a statutory shield against 
retaliatory lawsuits.117 Despite the lack of anti-SLAPP legislation in 
West Virginia, however, there are mechanisms inherent in Rule 11 of 
the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure and pertinent case law that 
can be utilized to combat such frivolous lawsuits—as we argue below. 
And such remedies also, of course, could be fruitfully explored in 
similarly situated jurisdictions that lack such comprehensive statutory 
shields (e.g., Ohio, as also implicated in our present case study). 
C.  Rule 11 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) requires four 
representations by the attorney to the court.118 In sum, the attorney 
certifies that the pleading, written motion, or other paper: (1) is not 
being presented for any improper purpose; (2) the claims, defenses, 
and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law;119 (3) the 
factual contentions have evidentiary support; and (4) the denials of 
factual contentions are warranted on the evidence.120 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 47–48. 
 116. Id. at 46. As discussed infra in Part V.A, we suggest one such test for screening legitimate 
First Amendment activity from the use of the justice system to chill free speech. 
 117. See sources cited supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 118. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). 
 119. Or reversing existing law or for establishing new law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2). 
 120. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). As Rule 11(b) states from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 
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As the ACLU of West Virginia argues in its amicus curiae brief, 
sanctions can be levied by the court on parties who bring cases for an 
improper purpose and can be used to deter future conduct.121 The 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure likewise provide a mechanism to 
discourage the filing of frivolous lawsuits or suits filed for an 
“improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or 
needlessly increase the cost of litigation” by levying sanctions against 
attorneys or the parties they represent for such filings.122 
One may contend that monetary fines are sufficient to compensate 
the injured party when punitive damages are taken into account. 
However, attorneys who file frivolous briefs may be able to ex ante 
protect themselves by simply charging a higher fee to pass the risk 
onto the client.123 Additionally, filers may rationally determine that the 
benefits of filing such frivolous suits outweigh the costs—in that 
removing the debate from a public forum to the legal arena would 
justify any direct monetary costs associated with filing a lawsuit.124 
Additionally, if the attorney is afraid of losing a lucrative client, she 
or he may be more willing to file a frivolous lawsuit in an effort to 
appease the client.125 Consequently, use of enhanced non-monetary 
sanctions against attorneys likely would prove more effective in 
deterring such frivolous lawsuits.126 
 
(b) REPRESENTATIONS TO THE COURT. By presenting to the court a pleading, 
written motion, or other paper—whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later 
advocating it—an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person’s 
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the 
circumstances:  
  (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause 
unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;  
  (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or 
by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for 
establishing new law;  
  (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, 
will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further 
investigation or discovery; and  
  (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically 
so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information. 
Id. Rule 11(c) outlines the procedure for imposing sanctions under these circumstances. FED. R. 
CIV. P. 11(c). 
 121. ACLU Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 45, at 10; see also Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463, 
466 (4th Cir. 1987); In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 524 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 122. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)–(c); see also supra text accompanying note 120. 
 123. See infra Part V.B.1 on the cost-benefit analysis that factors into filing a SLAPP suit. 
 124. See infra Part V.B.1 on the cost-benefit analysis that factors into filing a SLAPP suit. 
 125. See infra Part V.B.1. 
 126. See infra Part V.B.1. 
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D.  History of Federal Rule 11 
1.  Overview 
In J. Reid Mowrer’s 1998 article proposing the use of Rule 11 to 
curb SLAPP suits, he succinctly addresses the history of Rule 11 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.127 In 1983, Rule 11 was 
amended to enhance its effectiveness as a deterrent—i.e., to ultimately 
“broaden the scope of sanctionable actions, raise the standard of 
attorney behavior and encourage the application of sanctions as a 
deterrent tool.”128 However, in the amended Rule 11’s subsequent 
application, there was an “explosion of sanctions litigation” that 
“tipped the balance inappropriately towards deterrence at the expense 
of free access.”129 As is unpacked below, the 1993 amendments, then, 
attempted to address this imbalance by “broaden[ing] the scope of 
sanctionable activity while placing greater constraints on the 
imposition of sanctions.”130 
2.  1991 Survey of Rule 11 
In 1991, the Federal Judicial Center published a final report on 
Rule 11 to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States.131 The report included “(1) a survey 
of all federal district judges about their experiences with Rule 11; (2) 
an analysis of all district and appellate opinions published between 
1984 and 1989 that address Rule 11 issues; and (3) a study of Rule 11 
activity in five district courts.”132 Regarding the effectiveness of Rule 
11 in deterring “groundless” litigation, a majority found the Rule 
effective; however, a majority of judges also did not classify such 
litigation as a substantial problem.133 In fact, 38 percent of judges 
reported that “half or more requests for sanctions are themselves 
groundless.”134 Further, and particularly at issue here, the majority of 
 
 127. Mowrer, supra note 10, at 476–80. 
 128. Id. at 477. 
 129. Id. at 478. 
 130. Id. at 479–80. 
 131. See generally ELIZABETH C. WIGGINS ET. AL., FED. JUD. CTR., RULE 11: FINAL REPORT 
TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES 1 (1991), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/Rule11FR.pdf (providing an 
overview of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 with three major components that provide an 
analysis of Rule 11 as it pertains to all federal district judges and appellate opinions). 
 132. Id. at Overview and Acknowledgements Section. 
 133. Id. at 1. 
 134. Id. 
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judges found other mechanisms and rules to be more effective in 
addressing groundless litigation, including “prompt rulings on 
motions to dismiss and prompt rulings on motions for summary 
judgment. . . . informal admonitions and Rule 16 conferences.”135 The 
analysis of Rule 11 cases in five district courts looked at “(1) the 
amount of satellite litigation generated by Rule 11; (2) the extent to 
which Rule 11 activity has been disproportionately concentrated in 
specific types of cases or on particular type of litigants; and (3) the 
amount of judicial variation in sanctioning practices.”136 
One of the questions asked was whether a particular type of party 
was being disproportionately subjected to Rule 11.137 The most 
“targeted” pleadings were complaints.138 Thus, unsurprisingly, 
plaintiffs were “slightly or substantially more frequently” targeted 
than defendants.139 Civil rights cases tended to be targeted more than 
other types of suits.140 The percentage of orders imposing sanctions in 
the five districts ranged from 9 percent to 55 percent.141 In the context 
of civil rights cases and Rule 11, sanctions were more frequently 
imposed on plaintiffs and their attorneys.142 Monetary awards were the 
most common form of sanction, as compared to non-monetary 
sanctions such as admonitions or ordering continuing legal education 
classes.143 The monetary amounts were low, and one hypothesis of the 
authors was that “[t]hey may represent a deliberate effort to avoid the 
over-deterrence of employment discrimination claims.”144 
E.  Non-Monetary Sanctions 
Courts are required to consider non-monetary sanctions under 
Rule 11(c).145 A wide variety of non-monetary sanctions are available 
 
 135. Id. at 2. 
 136. Id. at 1. 
 137. Id. at 13. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 14. 
 140. Id. at 15–17. 
 141. Id. at 17–19. 
 142. Id. at 5. 
 143. Id. at 5–6. 
 144. Id. at 6. Note that, for the purposes of this Article, compiling empirical data on Rule 11 
rulings proved difficult because of the limitations of the various legal databases and the early stages 
at which some of the Rule 11 motions are brought, particularly if the issue results in dismissal at 
the 12(b)(6) stage. Because of these limitations, it is difficult to get a fair assessment of the 
frequency with which the types of cases at issue are burdening the court system. 
 145. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c). 
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to the court including: injunctions, admonitions, reprimands, censures, 
referrals to disciplinary authorities, required participation in 
educational programs (e.g., mandatory continuing legal education), 
professional trainings, an order precluding the introduction of certain 
evidence, an order precluding the litigation of certain issues, and 
dismissal of the action.146 Courts also have the ability to consider 
disciplinary action against lawyers who violate Rule 11. In fact, the 
intent behind the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 was to encourage more 
disciplinary referrals and to transition away from fee awards.147 Most 
courts, however, do not avail themselves of this remedy, preferring 
instead to bring the offending conduct to the attention of the 
appropriate disciplinary committee rather than directly disciplining 
the attorney.148 Some commentators argue that the appropriate state 
disciplinary body should investigate any lawyer who has received 
more than one Rule 11 sanction and that federal district clerks could 
easily effectuate such measures by reporting sanctions to state 
authorities.149 
Courts can sua sponte sanction an attorney; however, in doing so, 
a court may run afoul of due process issues.150 This is because when 
judges initiate disciplinary referrals for serious professional 
misconduct during civil litigation, they have both prosecutorial and 
judicial functions.151 Furthermore, judges can occupy a legislative role 
if the guidelines are unclear and also can occupy the role of a witness 
if the misconduct occurred in their presence.152 With this said, less 
serious violations, which often require sanctions such as a reprimand 
or a fine payable to the court, can be effectively administered by the 
presiding trial judge to promote general deterrence.153 
 
 146. Id.; see also Comm. on Fed. Cts., Comments on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and 
Related Rules, 46 REC. ASS’N BAR CITY N.Y. 267, 300–01 (1991) (listing the non-monetary 
sanctions imposed under Rule 11). 
 147. Jeffrey A. Parness, Disciplinary Referrals Under New Federal Civil Rule 11, 61 TENN. L. 
REV. 37, 46 (1993). 
 148. GEORGENE M. VAIRO, RULE 11 SANCTIONS: CASE LAW, PERSPECTIVES AND 
PREVENTATIVE MEASURES 574 (Richard G. Johnson ed., 3d ed. 2004). 
 149. Victor H. Kramer, Viewing Rule 11 as a Tool to Improve Professional Responsibility, 75 
MINN. L. REV. 793, 808–09 (1991). 
 150. See Thornton v. Gen. Motors Corp., 136 F.3d 450, 455 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions violated due process). 
 151. Parness, supra note 147, at 45. 
 152. Id. at 45–46. 
 153. Id. at 60. Some courts have argued that they need not recuse themselves from sua sponte 
Rule 11 sanctions. See, e.g., Lemaster v. United States, 891 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1989). Other courts 
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IV.  USING RULE 11 TO DETER ATTORNEYS FROM FILING FRIVOLOUS 
SUITS 
We contend that in the absence of anti-SLAPP legislation in 
jurisdictions such as West Virginia, the court may utilize Rule 11 to 
give attorneys pause before filing lawsuits violative of the First 
Amendment. If a plaintiff demonstrates an egregious pattern and 
practice of filing SLAPP-like suits, with typical SLAPP related claims 
repetitiously, with blatant “cut-and-pasted” complaints, the court, on 
motion or sua sponte, can utilize the power vested in it by Rule 11 to 
impose sanctions, in excess of costs and fees by including enhanced 
disciplinary action.154 
The remedy must be greater than attorney’s costs and fees, 
because the costs at such an early stage of dismissal would not be a 
sufficient deterrent.155 That is, an “appropriate level of deterrence” can 
be reached if the sanctions are more than simply costs and fees.156 
Thus, the risk of disciplinary action against an attorney may cause the 
attorney to pause and think twice before filing a frivolous SLAPP suit. 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, by its explicit 
construction, is designed in part to deter abusive litigious behavior.157 
This rule is well-suited to deter those who seek to chill free speech 
because “[t]he SLAPP filer focuses on use of the judicial process, as 
opposed to any anticipated judicial product, to silence the 
opponent.”158 Victor Kramer has argued that “courts should consider 
and interpret Rule 11 primarily as a tool to enforce the Rules of 
Professional Conduct in litigation rather than as a means to 
compensate litigants who become the victims of unprofessional 
conduct: deterrence rather than reimbursement should be the primary 
purpose of sanctioning lawyers.”159 
Furthermore, courts can impose sanctions sua sponte under Rule 
11(c)(3), which provides: “On the Court’s Initiative. On its own, the 
court may order an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why 
 
have recused themselves. See, e.g., Edwards v. Groner, 24 V.I. 292 (D.V.I. 1989); see also VAIRO, 
supra note 148, at 413 (citing cases in which courts have recused themselves or abstained from 
recusal after raising sanctions sua sponte). 
 154. Mowrer, supra note 10, at 484–85. 
 155. Id. at 485–86. 
 156. Id. at 486. 
 157. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 158. Mowrer, supra note 10, at 466. 
 159. Kramer, supra note 149, at 797. 
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conduct specifically described in the order has not violated Rule 
11(b).”160 Thus, to impose sua sponte sanctions, a court must issue an 
order to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed, and the 
order must describe the specific conduct believed to violate Rule 11.161 
Courts are limited in the types of sanctions that are imposed when 
raising sua sponte Rule 11 violations.162 Non-monetary sanctions are 
available; however, monetary sanctions can only be imposed on 
motion.163 
A.  ABA Sanction Survey and Attorney Discipline 
Cosentino argues that one solution is to penalize attorneys for 
bringing SLAPP suits through “disciplinary proceedings or monetary 
sanctions,” causing them to think twice before representing a chronic 
SLAPP filer.164 Numerous considerations factor into the calculus to 
determine if sanctions against the attorney are the appropriate remedy. 
At a minimum, however, the determination to use sanctions should 
include the nature of the sanctioned conduct, its consequence on 
others, and the purposes to be served by the sanctions.165 
Plaintiff’s counsel cannot evade bad faith arguments simply 
based on the fact that the client asked counsel to conduct the case and 
draft allegations in a specific manner. These arguments have been 
considered and dismissed by the Fourth Circuit.166 Accordingly, 
arguments based on client desires and conduct should not be utilized 
as an excuse for filing frivolous lawsuits. So long as counsel knows 
that the suit is frivolous, “[c]ounsel can no longer avoid the sting of 
Rule 11 sanctions by operating under the guise of a pure heart and 
empty head.”167 
A brief survey of disciplinary action imposed by the Supreme 
Court of West Virginia within the last five years did not reflect any 
strong trend as to who was subject to such action or why.168 What these 
 
 160. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(3). 
 161. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2)–(3); see Parness, supra note 147, at 45. 
 162. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(5)(B). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Cosentino, supra note 14, at 410. 
 165. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 166. Blair v. Shenandoah Women’s Ctr., Inc., 757 F.2d 1435, 1438 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 167. Smith v. Ricks, 31 F.3d 1478, 1488 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Zuniga v. United Can Co., 
812 F.2d 443, 452 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
 168. See generally AM. BAR ASS’N: CTR. FOR PRO. RESP., ABA STANDING COMM. ON PRO. 
DISCIPLINE, 2016 SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS (S.O.L.D.) (2018), 
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data appear to reveal is that imposition of disciplinary sanctions, at 
least in West Virginia, is used sparingly, particularly the harsher 
impositions, such as debarment.169 
Issues with using disciplinary sanctions against attorneys include 
a potential SLAPP suit being insufficient in and of itself to spur action 
by a disciplinary board, the inability of citizens making complaints to 
“distinguish a frivolous claim from a legitimate claim,” the inability 
of judges and attorneys to recognize a SLAPP suit as such, and “a 
general reluctance” of judges and attorneys to report each other.170 As 
the data provided demonstrate, there may be difficulty in finding 
success via disciplinary action. 
B.  Attorney Discipline as a Remedy 
Rule 11 was broadened under the 1983 amendments. Specifically, 
Rule 11 was amended to require a “‘reasonable inquiry’ from the 
attorney concerning his client’s claims and defenses.”171 The 1983 
amendments included two important changes: (1) the scope of Rule 11 
was broadened to apply to a greater range of pleadings; and (2) 
sanctions were mandatory when a violation was found.172 
Interestingly, these changes to Rule 11 led to increased litigation, most 
likely due to the rule’s broader scope and fee-shifting power.173 
Additionally, some attorneys would use sanctions as a weapon or 
bargaining tool to help leverage negotiations with opposing 
counsel.174 
Under the 1993 amendments, the aim of Rule 11 sanctions was to 
pivot away from compensation and towards deterrence.175 Per the 
amendments, the focus was less on attorney’s fees and more on such 
deterrence-focused mechanisms as fines paid to the court and shifting 
 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/2016sol
d_results.pdf [hereinafter 2016 SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS] (showing a history of 
past ABA S.O.L.D. surveys lacking an ascertainable trend over five years up to and including 
2018). 
 169. See id. 
 170. Cosentino, supra note 14, at 419. 
 171. James W. Devine, Note, Rule 11’s Big-Mouthed Little Brother: How a Federal Anti-
SLAPP Statute Would Reproduce Rule 11’s Growing Pains, 9 AVE MARIA L. REV. 367, 384 (2011). 
 172. Id.; see also Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 190–93 
(1988) (discussing the controversy around amendments made to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure Rule 11). 
 173. Georgene Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 589, 598–99 (1998). 
 174. Devine, supra note 171, at 385. 
 175. Parness, supra note 147, at 46. 
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misconduct fine responsibility to not just attorneys, but also to 
attorneys’ law firms via joint responsibility principles.176 Other 
mechanisms such as continuing legal education requirements, 
reprimands, and referrals to bar disciplinary entities also could be 
favored via a deterrence-based approach.177 
Attorney discipline as a sua sponte remedy by the court in the 
anti-SLAPP suit context should alleviate some concerns emanating 
from the potential use of sanctions as a bargaining tactic. Lawyers 
could still use attorney sanctions as a bargaining tool, but they would 
no longer receive any monetary benefits as part of the remedy. 
Accordingly, frivolous Rule 11 motions should not be an issue 
because the fee-shifting remedy would not be an option for litigants.178 
Furthermore, the use of sanctions as a bargaining tool would also be 
diminished because these sanctions would be court initiated, and not 
initiated at the bequest of litigants.179 However, one potential 
stumbling block with such a sua sponte remedy is the due process issue 
mentioned in Part III.F above. 
C.  Current Use of Rule 11 Sanctions: Suspension and Debarment 
Courts have been reluctant to use the sanctioning power of Rule 
11.180 State bars also rarely use suspension or debarment as a means 
of deterring bad behavior. The American Bar Association (ABA) has 
been collecting data regarding sanctions, caseloads, budget, and 
staffing for public and educational use.181 The result, the Survey in 
Lawyer Discipline Systems (S.O.L.D.), provides statistics on lawyer 
discipline from many jurisdictions nationally.182 The ABA has 
historical surveys dating back to 1998.183 
West Virginia has participated in all surveys except those 
conducted in 2013, 2012, 2005, 1999, and 1998.184 According to the 
 
 176. See Jeffrey A. Parness, Fines Under New Federal Civil Rule 11: The New Monetary 
Sanctions for the “Stop-and-Think-Again” Rule, 1993 BYU L. REV. 879, 903. 
 177. Id. at 890. 
 178. Devine, supra note 171, at 387. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, supra note 173, at 623. 
 181. See generally 2016 SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS, supra note 168 (showing 
data related to a 2016 survey regarding lawyer discipline systems). 
 182. See id. 
 183. See Historical ABA S.O.L.D. Surveys, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/ 
groups/professional_responsibility/resources/historicalabasoldsurveys/ (last visited Nov. 22, 
2020). 
 184. Id. 
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2016 report, West Virginia had 6,856 lawyers with active licenses, and 
the disciplinary agency received 596 complaints.185 Three hundred 
and forty of those complaints were from prior years, 232 of those 
complaints were summarily dismissed or screened out, and 936 were 
investigated.186 297 were dismissed after the investigation.187 Eighteen 
of the lawyers were ultimately charged, 18 publicly disciplined, 6 
involuntarily disbarred, 5 suspended (excluding interim suspensions), 
4 suspended in the interim for risk of harm or criminal convictions, 3 
were admonished, reprimanded, or censured, 3 placed on probation, 3 
ordered to pay restitution, and 13 ordered to pay costs.188 Interestingly, 
there were two motions or requests for reinstatement and readmission: 
one was granted after debarment and one was granted after 
suspension.189 
V.  PROPOSED TEST FOR APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS AND ATTORNEY 
DISCIPLINE 
The purpose of this novel four-part test is to discriminate between 
those suits brought for legitimate reasons versus those frivolous suits 
that are brought about to silence the media or prevent citizens from 
voicing legitimate concerns against private parties or the government. 
Although it does not appear that these suits happen with great 
frequency, when such suits are brought, they have the ability to wreak 
substantial, far-reaching harms to both free speech and public 
participation—i.e., including multidimensional harms emanating from 
later-in-time chilling effects.190 This four-part test would help 
determine if the SLAPP suit falls within the most egregious forms of 
frivolous litigation and suggest a remedy that is based in large part on 
deterring the filing of future frivolous suits. Accordingly, this test must 
consider the parties involved, damages requested, as well as how this 
litigation functions within the SLAPP filer’s broader strategy to 
silence dissident voices. 
In summary, this test weighs four main factors: (1) a pattern of 
conduct and similarity of complaints; (2) the nature of the defendants; 
(3) proportionality of damages; and (4) if a countersuit is at issue. If 
 
 185. 2016 SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS, supra note 168, Chart 1, pt. A, 3. 
 186. Id. Chart 1, pt. B, 3. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id.; id. Chart 3, pt. B, 4. 
 189. Id. Charts 4, 3. 
 190. See Pring & Canan, supra note 74, at 941–44. 
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these factors weigh heavily in favor of the defendant, then the true 
intent of the filer may be suppression of protected free speech. 
Consequently, enhanced attorney sanctions in the form of suspension 
or debarment may be an appropriate remedy to deter future filings of 
a similar, deeply problematic nature. 
A.  Test for Applying Attorney Sanctions 
1.  Pattern of Conduct 
As one important factor, enhanced attorney sanctions are likely 
an appropriate remedy for frivolous litigation when the plaintiff 
habitually files “cookie-cutter” suits. If deterrence indeed is the 
ultimate goal, when a party exhibits a clear pattern of utilizing the legal 
system to suppress free speech, then attorney sanctions are the 
appropriate remedy. Note, however, that direct evidence of specific 
intent to file a suit for harassment purposes will seldom be found; thus, 
intent can be inferred by the surrounding circumstances. If a plaintiff 
consistently files suits using the same arguments with the same fact 
pattern without proffering a new legal argument—and if the suits are 
consistently dismissed at either the 12(b)(6) or summary judgment 
stage—then this strongly evidences a pattern of misconduct. 
For example, Robert Murray has filed no less than six suits 
against news and media organizations, as well as some individuals, to 
suppress their free speech rights.191 Unsurprisingly, most of these suits 
have not survived the 12(b)(6) or the summary judgement motions by 
defendants.192 Although one or two suits may not be enough to 
establish that the filer is improperly wielding the legal system to harass 
and silence the media, six or seven suits should suffice. 
Courts should further consider if the defamation filer uses 
identical complaint language in multiple cases or otherwise alleges the 
same type of fact pattern. As discussed above in Part II.B, six 
complaints filed by Murray Energy, Robert Murray, or one of the 
subsidiaries had multiple paragraphs that were either identical or 
nearly identical.193 Tables 1 and 2 review the language used in the 
complaints filed by Robert Murray as well as the outcomes of these 
suits. These “cookie-cutter” complaints with near-identical 
 
 191. See sources cited supra note 67 and accompanying text; infra Table 2. 
 192. See infra Table 2. 
 193. See infra Table 1. 
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language—i.e., as combined with the pattern of conduct and the suits’ 
ultimate dismissals—help demonstrate the improper purpose of the 
suits.194 
Note also that potential watchdog entities may occupy a helpful 
role in tracking such problematic complaint patterns. For instance, Lili 
Levi argues that one response to corporations targeting media via 
indirect funding for litigation (i.e., as discussed above) can involve 
cultivating private watchdogs in the form of institutions or pertinent 
concerned individuals.195 Such watchdogs could track corporate 
funds, enhance public knowledge about such practices, and generally 
advocate for greater corporate funding accountability, best press 
practices, and so forth.196 Therefore, in the context of our case study 
and broader discussion, watchdog entities similarly could track 
litigants who exhibit a pattern of filing frivolous lawsuits with “cut 
and paste” complaint language—which would further the “goal of 
promoting transparency and accountability” among these problematic 
repeat actors.197 
2.  Nature of the Defendants 
This second factor reflects an important principle: that to support 
the public interest, greater protection should be provided to some types 
of litigants than others. Because the ultimate goal of Rule 11 is to deter 
frivolous litigation, the anti-SLAPP privilege should be more 
expansive for those parties that disseminate factual information or that 
give legitimate analyses to authentic newsworthy information. Thus, 
this factor would provide greater protection to legitimate news 
organizations that report factual material with additional explanations, 
observations, or interpretations. 
In a defamation suit, the classification of the party already is 
considered one potential defense against defamation—namely under 
“qualified privilege.” Qualified privilege is the special legal right or 
immunity given to parties for acts committed in performance of a legal 
or moral duty and are exercised free from malice. The defense is stated 
as a communication whose “essential elements . . . are good faith, an 
interest to be upheld, a statement limited in its scope to the upholding 
 
 194. See infra Table 1. 
 195. Levi, supra note 29, at 817. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
(12) 54.2_TU & STUMP.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/23/21  9:58 AM 
2021] FRIVOLOUS SLAPP SUITS AND RULE 11 SANCTIONS 655 
of such interest and publication in a proper manner only to proper 
parties.”198 One archetypal example of the qualified privilege is the 
immunity for members of the press for statements made in good 
faith—such as the media organizations at issue in our present Murray 
case study. Accordingly, providing greater protection to one type of 
party in a defamation suit—i.e., including in the explicit context of the 
press—does not tread new legal ground. 
In summary, then, if the defendant in a SLAPP suit is a media or 
news organization simply reporting truthful facts, then courts should 
take this into account beyond the simple “absolute immunity” defense 
in a defamation suit. On the other side of the coin, if the plaintiff in a 
SLAPP suit is a bad-faith actor that repeatedly brings similar suits 
based on similar facts, courts should weigh this factor accordingly.199 
3.  Proportionality of Damages 
As a third factor, we suggest a proportionality analysis where the 
court examines the claimed violation and damages requested. 
Damages in a tort case are designed in large part to compensate the 
victim—i.e., to make the party whole. When the damages requested 
are disproportionate to the alleged harm, then the victim is seeking 
either punitive damages or the deterrent value of the suit. Accordingly, 
if the damages requested by the filer are so high as to be disassociated 
from the reality of the harm done to the victim, then the more likely 
the filer is using the case to improperly suppress free speech. 
For example, in the 2001 Murray suit against the Akron Beacon 
Journal for a defamation claim, the alleged damage suffered was $1 
billion.200 However, in 2005, for instance, Murray Energy’s total sales 
amounted to only $450 million.201 It is therefore very unlikely that this 
article published in a relatively regional market could damage 
Murray’s entire business to the point of bankruptcy twice over. 
 
 198. Dobbyn v. Nelson, 579 P.2d 721, 723 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978), aff’d, 587 P.2d 315 (Kan. 
1978) (quoting Senogles v. Sec. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 536 P.2d 1358 (Kan. 1975)); see also A.G. 
Harmon, Defamation in Good Faith: An Argument for Restating the Defense of Qualified Privilege, 
16 BARRY L. REV. 27 (2011) (providing a historical investigation on the original meaning of 
“Defamation in Good Faith” and argues for a return to this first understanding). 
 199. See supra Part V.A.1. 
 200. Al Cross, Controversial Coal Operator Threatens to Sue Coal Age Editor, Penn State 
Professor over Criticism, THE RURAL BLOG (Sept. 25, 2007, 11:37 AM), http://irjci.blogspot.co
m/2007/09/murray-threatens-to-sue-editor.html. 
 201. MILLION DOLLAR DIRECTORY SERIES: AMERICA’S LEADING PUBLIC & PRIVATE 
COMPANIES 2006, at 3276 (2005). 
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Accordingly, the damages requested were grossly disproportionate to 
the alleged harm done—and thus this fact constitutes additional 
circumstantial evidence indicating that the suit was filed for purposes 
other than simple compensation to make the victim whole. 
4.  Not a Countersuit 
As a final factor, SLAPP suits must be differentiated from 
“countersuits.”202 Countersuits differ from SLAPP suits because the 
original party—i.e., an environmental group or other type of public 
interest organization—is not simply voicing an opinion on a specific 
cause, but instead files suit to halt an action that the organization 
believes is harmful. In response, similar to a traditional SLAPP suit, 
the defendant will file a countersuit to intimidate the original plaintiff. 
These environmental and related countersuits should not be 
subject to immediate attorney sanctions for three significant reasons. 
First, the original party that filed suit is typically a large environmental 
organization familiar with the judicial system. Second, when filing the 
original suit, the initial filer often will have access to a relatively large 
amount of capital, and thus will not suffer from individual liability or 
the psychological toll associated with litigation targeted at individual 
citizens. Third, as the original filer was the first to bring suit, there is 
a smaller likelihood of deterring future parties from filing suit or from 
raising public attention on the issue due to fear of financial retribution. 
Therefore, unlike a traditional SLAPP suit target that is simply using 
the political process to air their grievances, those parties subject to 
countersuits can anticipate and prepare for the possibility of legal 
retaliation. Additionally, unlike a traditional SLAPP suit, the filer is 
not moving the discussion from the public forum to a legal forum 
because the original discussion began in a legal context. 
In the context of our case study, in all instances in which Murray 
filed suit, such actions were against news organizations or individuals 
that spoke out critically against Murray Energy or Robert Murray as 
its CEO. As a consequence, the conduct at issue was standard media 
criticism and did not originate as a lawsuit against Murray enterprises. 
 
 202. Cosentino, supra note 14, at 405; David Sive, Countersuits, Delay, Intimidation Caused 
by Public Interest Suits, NAT’L L.J., June 19, 1989, at 5; see also Note, Counterclaim and 
Countersuit Harassment of Private Environmental Plaintiffs: The Problem, Its Implications, and 
Proposed Solutions, 74 MICH. L. REV. 106 (1975) (discussing the basic characteristics of the 
counterclaim strategy, the implications of its future proliferation, and proposals to eliminate the 
impact of the strategy in terms of its effectiveness). 
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Murray was therefore the instigator who sought to move the case from 
a political forum to the legal arena—and the countersuit factor 
discussed above, then, is not applicable. 
B.  Attorney Sanctions as a Remedy 
Anti-SLAPP remedies—such as the enhanced sanctions we 
explore below—are especially important when utilized to protect the 
press in its mission of disseminating truthful information to the public 
about potential bad actors. This is, of course, a vital watchdog function 
in healthy democracies. What is more, the sanctions we explore below 
also comport with the current rubric of Rule 11—in that, namely, when 
looking to SLAPP-type behavior under Rule 11, the most important 
court determination is whether the suit is being brought to harass or 
silence news or media organizations, concerned individual citizens, or 
related entities. 
1.  Costs and Benefits Associated with Filing a SLAPP Suit 
As introduced above in this Article, monetary compensation often 
proves insufficient in deterring attorneys from filing frivolous suits 
because (1) firms may simply charge the client more to file these suits 
as a risk-shifting practice; and (2) clients may be willing to take these 
risks via a simple cost-benefit analysis. On the latter point, a rational 
SLAPP suit filer may determine that the benefits of filing a suit greatly 
outweigh the potential direct costs. First, the actual monetary costs of 
filing a suit may be low. If the filer simply “cuts and pastes” much of 
the complaint from prior complaint language, then the costs to file 
indeed are minimal. Additionally, if a suit is dismissed at the 12(b)(6) 
stage and attorney costs are shifted to the filer, the costs may be 
minimal because the dismissal was at such an early litigation stage. 
Moreover, attorneys may be willing to file these frivolous suits to 
maintain a good relationship with the client for work that is 
independent of the SLAPP suit. Furthermore, the ultimate benefits of 
suppressing media coverage can be enormous, especially when the 
chilling effects on potential later-in-time negative publicity are 
considered. Millionaires such as Murray and the lawyers who work 
for him, therefore, often are willing to risk tens of thousands of dollars 
in filing a SLAPP suit when the benefits of silencing negative 
publicity could equal an estimated much greater amount. 
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To actually deter these types of “cookie-cutter” frivolous suits, 
then, remedies should not be directed against the powerful, well-
capitalized client—but rather at the lawyers who file such suits despite 
their institutional expertise and clear professional ethics 
responsibilities. Consequently, in such egregious circumstances, 
enhanced attorney sanctions such as suspension or debarment are an 
appropriate remedy. 
2.  Attorney Suspensions and Debarment Already Comport with Rule 
11(b) 
Rule 11(b) sets out the requirements for documents that attorneys 
present to the court.203 There are four main requirements enumerated 
in Rule 11(b): (1) documents are not being presented for any improper 
purpose; (2) the claims, defenses, and other contentions are warranted 
by existing law or argument for altering existing law; (3) factual 
contentions have evidentiary support; and (4) denials of factual 
contentions are warranted.204 
As an initial matter, the requirements of Rule 11(b)(3) and (4) 
deal with factual contentions and are typically not at dispute in this 
variety of SLAPP litigation. That is, when looking to the four 
representations that are required under Rule 11, the factual contentions 
are usually not at issue since all parties admit to the factual 
contentions. For example, in the context of the Murray litigation 
against Oliver, neither party contested the factual information 
disclosed in Oliver’s segment as it was aired on national television. 
Accordingly, there is no issue with the affirmative duty to investigate 
the facts of the case because the facts are uncontested. 
Rule 11(b)(2), however, is directly at issue for this variety of 
SLAPP suit. Rule 11(b)(2) requires that the attorney certify that “the 
claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing 
law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or 
reversing existing law or for establishing new law.”205 Rule 11 
“explicitly and unambiguously imposes an affirmative duty on each 
attorney to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the viability of a pleading 
before it is signed.”206 Additionally, Rule 11 “imposes a duty on 
 
 203. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). 
 204. Id. 
 205. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2). 
 206. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985). 
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attorneys to certify that they . . . have determined that any papers filed 
with the court are well grounded in fact, legally tenable, and ‘not 
interposed for any improper purpose.’”207 
In our case study, we find a violation of Rule 11(b)(2) as exhibited 
by Murray’s decades long pattern of litigation. The lawyers 
representing Murray clearly used a boilerplate complaint because the 
complaint was “cut and pasted” from previous complaints used against 
other news organizations.208 For instance, Murray’s defamation cause 
of action against Oliver was nearly identical to the complaints brought 
against the New York Times in 2017 and the Huffington Post in 
2013.209 The false light invasion of privacy cause of action against 
Oliver also was nearly identical to the complaints brought against Bill 
Moyer in 2014 and the Huffington Post in 2013.210 The lawyers filing 
Murray’s complaint therefore knew they were filing a case based on 
very similar facts and knew the outcome of these cases were either 
dismissal or summary judgment. And because these complaints were 
nearly identical to the previous failed cases, the complaints do not 
convey additional facts suggesting a “nonfrivolous argument for 
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing 
new law.”211 
Significantly, note that an example of sua sponte Rule 11 
sanctions in response to this boilerplate type of pleading can be seen 
in Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc.212 In Rodgers, the court 
stated “[t]hese boilerplate allegations evincing counsel’s carelessness 
in drafting and filing this complaint only illustrate the appropriateness 
of the district court’s assessing sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.”213 
The court’s argument certainly is apropos to attorney conduct in the 
Murray litigation context as well. 
Finally, Rule 11(b)(1) requires that the attorney certify that the 
document submitted to the court is “not being presented for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or 
needlessly increase the cost of litigation.”214 The first factor of the 
 
 207. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990) (emphasis added). 
 208. See infra Table 1. 
 209. See infra Table 1. 
 210. See infra Table 1. 
 211. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2). 
 212. 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 213. Id. at 204 n.6. 
 214. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1). 
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four-part test proposed above in Part V.A.1 helps determine if the 
filing was effectuated with the intent to suppress free speech or, in the 
alternative, to legitimately compensate the victim for harm done by a 
tortfeasor. As noted above, direct evidence of the specific intent to file 
a suit for harassment purposes will seldom be found, so intent must be 
inferred from the surrounding circumstances. 
C.  Finding Balance Within the First Amendment: Free Speech v. 
Access to the Courts 
Just as the First Amendment protects free speech, it also protects 
access to the courts.215 Neither right is absolute. However, where a 
party exhibits a clear pattern of practice in filing retaliatory litigation 
to silence critics, the use of the judicial process for the purpose of 
suppressing free speech rights interferes with the administration of 
justice—thus making it an improper, sanctionable filing under Rule 11 
of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure in the context of our 
case study (i.e., and comparable Rule 11 violations in the broader 
United States).216 
Since 2001, Murray Energy or a subsidiary, and Robert Murray, 
sometimes together and sometimes apart, have sued media entities for 
claims linked to defamation eleven times,217 and a union treasurer for 
statements made to a newspaper three times.218 Since 2012, eight of 
those suits, excluding the Oliver suit, were filed and all but one 
(regarding a radio ad) were related to media or the press.219 The 
negative impacts on free speech emanating from these frivolous 
lawsuits did not go unnoticed by the courts nor by the media.220 In 
Murray v. Knight-Ridder,221 the case settled, and the article was 
 
 215. Mowrer, supra note 10, at 465 n.2, 475. 
 216. W. VA. CODE. ANN. R. 11 (LexisNexis 2021). 
 217. Claims varied, including defamation, false light invasion of privacy, intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, misappropriation of trade secrets, tortious interference of contract, and civil 
conspiracy. See infra Table 1. 
 218. E.g., Murray v. Tarley, No. C2-01-693, 2002 WL 484537, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 21, 2002). 
 219. See, e.g., id. 
 220. Peters, supra note 76; Murray v. Chagrin Valley Publ’g Co., 25 N.E.3d 1111, 1125 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2014) (expressing that the case exemplified the need of adoption of anti-SLAPP legislation 
to prevent chilling effects of this type of litigation); Murray Energy Holdings Co. v. Mergermarket 
USA, Inc., No. 15-CV-2844, 2016 WL 3365422, at *7, *8 (S.D. Ohio June 17, 2016) (stating “a 
party who seeks a prior restraint ‘carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition 
of such a restraint’” with regard for the request of a declaratory judgment preventing publication 
of information). 
 221. No. 02 BE 45, 2004 WL 333250 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2004). 
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retracted.222 After threatening litigation, Coal Age published an 
apology to Murray.223 One of the defendants in Murray v. Chagrin 
ended up “scrubb[ing]” its website of the article at issue, despite 
settlement.224 
The court in Chagrin—in essentially classifying the case as a 
SLAPP suit—wrote in its opinion that such frivolous lawsuits “can be 
devastating to individual defendants or small news organizations and 
act to chill criticism and debate. The fact that the Chagrin Valley Times 
website has been scrubbed of all mention of Murray or this protest is 
an example of the chilling effects this has,” and the court also 
recommended that the Ohio legislature adopt anti-SLAPP 
legislation.225 However, as noted above, Ohio has not adopted such a 
statutory shield, nor has West Virginia or numerous other 
jurisdictions.226 Moreover, as also noted above, after the Chagrin 
opinion was published in December 2014, Murray filed lawsuits 
against Bloomberg in Ohio and the New York Times and John Oliver 
in West Virginia.227 To be sure, such prior decisions did not constitute 
an actual deterrent for Murray Energy or Robert Murray as its CEO—
and likely also will not deter those future-in-time, well-capitalized 
entities that are all-too-eager to suppress critical speech of news 
organizations and the like following a simple cost-benefit analysis. 
The people have the right to “petition the government for a 
redress of grievances.”228 As discussed above, civil rights lawsuits 
have historically been a target of Rule 11 motions.229 As Cosentino 
also argues, any solution “must not deny plaintiffs due process of law” 
or otherwise be violative of the U.S. Constitution.230 And tort claims 
of an unusual character are not inherently illegitimate.231 Thus, any 
 
 222. Peters, supra note 76. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Chagrin, 25 N.E.3d at 1124. 
 225. Id. at 1124–25. 
 226. Anti-SLAPP Statutes and Commentary, supra note 85. West Virginia does have case law 
that provides some anti-SLAPP protection. See, e.g., Harris v. Adkins, 432 S.E.2d 549 (W. Va. 
1993). 
 227. Murray Energy Holdings Co. v. Bloomberg, L.P., No. 2:15-CV-2845, 2016 WL 3355456 
(S.D. Ohio June 17, 2016); Oliver Complaint, supra note 40, at 1; The N.Y. Times Complaint, 
supra note 42, at 1. 
 228. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 229. Wiggins et. al., supra note 131, at 15–19. 
 230. Cosentino, supra note 14, at 412. 
 231. The West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure permit a “non frivolous argument for the 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law.” W. VA. CODE. 
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rule drafted to protect free speech must also protect the right to petition 
government.232 However, as we have argued in this Article, a remedy 
involving more severe attorney sanctions—i.e., as carefully weighed 
by courts utilizing the four-part test proffered above—strikes the 
necessary balance between access to courts and constitutionally 
protected free speech. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Numerous media outlets, newspapers, and concerned individual 
citizens lack the resources required to combat frivolous defamation 
suits brought by powerful, well-capitalized entities.233 As the court in 
Chargin articulates, SLAPP suits “can be devastating to individual 
defendants or small news organizations and act to chill criticism and 
debate.”234 Moreover, the multidimensional benefits of SLAPP suits 
typically outweigh the financial costs to such powerful actors—as our 
case study in the form of Murray Energy and Robert Murray as its 
CEO so aptly demonstrates. Consequently, while recognizing the 
delicate balance between free speech and access to the courts—and in 
the absence of anti-SLAPP legislation—enhanced Rule 11 sanctions, 
including attorney suspension and debarment, can be utilized by courts 
to deter such abusive litigation tactics. And the novel four-part test 
proffered in this Article could closely inform courts’ weighing and 
levying of such sanctions. Ultimately, such a judicial corrective could 
help protect the constitutionally protected free speech rights of the 





ANN. R. 11(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2021). Similarly, 11(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
permits a “nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for 
establishing new law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2). 
 232. Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28, 47–48 (W. Va. 1981) (Neely, J., dissenting), overruled by 
Harris v. Adkins, 432 S.E.2d 549 (W. Va. 1993). 
 233. See Murray Corporate Overview, supra note 37. 
 234. Murray v. Chagrin Valley Publ’g Co., 25 N.E.3d 1111, 1124 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014). 
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¶ 58—Plaintiffs restate 
and reallege all of the 
other paragraphs of this 




¶ 21— Plaintiffs 




as if fully set 
forth herein. 
   
Count I— Defamation: 
¶ 59—Upon information 
and belief, Defendants 
caused the Defamatory 
Statements to be 
published with 
knowledge of the falsity 
of those statements or 
with reckless disregard 










Statement to be 
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knowledge of 
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Statements to be 
published with 
knowledge of 
the falsity of the 
statements 
contained 
therein or with 
reckless or 
negligent 
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 235. For Table 1, the litigation outcomes for unlisted cases were as follows: Tarley (2002) 
[12(b)(1) granted for defamation]; Knight-Ridder (2004) [(1)—summary judgment for defendant, 
(2) reverse for Murray]. 
 236. See generally Oliver Complaint, supra note 40. 
 237. See generally The N.Y. Times Complaint, supra note 42. 
 238. See Murray v. TheHuffingtongPost.com, Inc., 13 CV 347 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas Sept. 
24, 2013).  
 239. See Murray v. The Chagrin Valley Publishing Company, CV 13 811106 (Ohio Ct. 
Common Pleas July 23, 2013). 
 240. See Murray v. Moyers, 14 CV 321 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas Oct. 20, 2014). 
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Count I— Defamation: 
¶60—The Defamatory 
Statements are 
defamatory per se in that, 
on their face, they reflect 
upon Plaintiffs’ 
reputation and character 
in a manner that: (1) 
injured Plaintiffs’ 
reputation and subject 
Plaintiffs to public 
hatred, ridicule, shame, 
or disgrace; and (2) 
adversely affected 
Plaintiffs’ trades or 
businesses. In the 
alternative, the 
Defamatory Statements 
are defamatory per quod 
in that they are capable 
of being interpreted as 
reflecting upon 
Plaintiffs’ reputation or 
character in a manner 
that: (1) injured 
Plaintiffs’ reputation or 
expose them to public 
hatred, ridicule, shame, 
or disgrace; and (2) 
adversely affected 
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him to public 
hatred, ridicule, 
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disgrace; and (2) 
adversely affects 
his trades and/or 
businesses. 
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Plaintiffs’ trades 
or businesses. 
Count I— Defamation: 
¶61—The Defamatory 
statements were 
published and continue 
to be published with 
malice and without 


































Count I— Defamation: 
¶ 61—The Defamatory 
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published and continue 
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Count I— Defamation: 
¶ 62— Publication of the 
Defamatory Statements 
will cause Plaintiffs to 
encounter more difficulty 
in securing performance 
surety bonds from 
lenders to support their 
businesses and Plaintiffs 
may have to collateralize 
them at higher levels, 
and publication of the 
Defamatory Statements 
already caused Plaintiffs 
harm in this regard by 
damaging their 
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¶ 63— Publication of the 
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Plaintiffs harm in this 
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Count I— Defamation: 
¶ 64— Publication of the 
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will cause Plaintiffs to 
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businesses, and 
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regard by damaging their 
reputations with such 













Count I— Defamation: 
¶ 65— Publication of the 
Defamatory Statements 
will cause Plaintiffs to 
suffer a loss of business 
opportunities and loss of 
potential or existing 
customers for their 
businesses, and 
publication of the 
Defamatory Statements 
already has caused 
Plaintiffs harm in this 
regard by damaging their 
reputations with such 
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Count I— Defamation: 
¶ 68— Publication of the 
Defamatory Statements 
has caused and will 
continue to cause 
damage to Plaintiffs’ 
reputation and good 
standing in their 
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Count II—False Light 
Invasion of Privacy: 
¶ 70—The 
Defamatory Statements 
constitute false light 
invasion of privacy in 
that the Defamatory 
Statements have 
subjected Plaintiffs to 
unreasonable and 
highly objectionable 
publicity by attributing to 
them characteristics, 
conduct, or beliefs 
that are false, thereby 
placing them in a false 
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Count II—False light 
invasion of privacy: 
¶71—The false light in 
which Plaintiffs have 
been placed due to 
publication of the 
Defamatory Statements 
would be highly 
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reasonable 
person. 
Count II—False Light 
Invasion of Privacy: 
¶ 72—Defendants 
had knowledge of the 
falsity of the Defamatory 
Statements or acted in 
reckless disregard as to 
the falsity of 
the Defamatory 
Statements and the false 
light in which Plaintiffs 








of the falsity of 
the Defamatory 
Statements or 
acted in reckless 
disregard as to 
the falsity of the 
Defamatory 
Statements and 




would be placed. 
  
Count II—False Light 
Invasion of Privacy: 
¶73—Publication of the 
Defamatory Statements 
has caused and will 
continue to cause 
Plaintiffs and members 
of Mr. Murray’s family 
to suffer great mental 










caused and will 
continue to 
cause Murray 
and members of 
Murray’s family 



























caused and will 
continue to 
cause Mr. Murry 
and members of 





Count II—False Light 
Invasion of Privacy: 
¶ 74—Publication of the 
Defamatory Statements 
will cause Plaintiffs to 
encounter more difficulty 
in securing performance 
surety bonds from 
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businesses and Plaintiffs 
may have to collateralize 
















these bonds at 
higher levels. 





from lenders to 
support their 
businesses and 




these bonds at 
higher levels. 
Count II—False Light 
Invasion of Privacy: 
¶ 75—Publication of the 
Defamatory Statements 
will cause lenders to be 
less willing to engage in 
financing transactions 
with Plaintiffs, thereby 
preventing them from 
gaining access to capital 
needed to operate their 
businesses or making it 
more difficult and 
expensive for them to 









cause lenders to 
be less willing 












making it more 
difficult and 
expensive for 









cause lenders to 
be less willing 
to engage in 
financing 
transactions 









making it more 
difficult and 
more expense 
for them to 
obtain such 
capital. 
Count II—False Light 
Invasion of Privacy: 










of privacy (All 
defendant): 
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will cause Plaintiffs to 
encounter difficulty in 
having effective 
discussion with public 
officials, including 
regulatory agencies, 
regarding matters of 





































concern to their 
businesses. 
Count II—False Light 
Invasion of Privacy: 
¶ 77—Publication of the 
Defamatory Statements 
will cause Plaintiffs to 
suffer a loss of business 
opportunities and loss of 
potential or existing 
customers for their 
businesses. 
   
Count I—False 
Light Invasion 







to suffer a loss 
of business 
opportunities 





Count II—False Light 
Invasion of Privacy: 
¶ 78—Publication of the 
Defamatory Statements 
will cause Plaintiffs to 
suffer a loss of business 
opportunities and loss of 
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suffer a loss of 
business 
opportunities 





Count II—False Light 
Invasion of Privacy: 
¶ 79—Publication of the 
Defamatory Statements 
has caused and will 
continue to cause 
damage to Plaintiffs’ 
reputation and good 
standing in their 
community and industry. 
   
Count I—False 
Light Invasion 




caused and will 
continue to 
cause Mr. 




injury to his 
reputation as a 
leader in the 
coal mining 
industry that he 
has worked for 
decade to build 
and maintain. 
Count II—False Light 
Invasion of Privacy: 
¶ 79—Publication of the 
Defamatory Statements 
has caused and will 
continue to cause 
damage to Plaintiffs’ 
reputation and good 
standing in their 
community and industry. 
   
Count I—False 
Light Invasion 




caused and will 
continue to 
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Huffington 




























Co.; CV 13 
811106; 13 
CV 14 
Court of Appeals 
















































































OH; Judge Frank 
Fregiato; 








 [Court found 
that Plaintiff 



























  Motion to 
Dismiss 
Granted 
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Knight-
Ridder; 
02 BE 45 







Defamation Reversal of 
SJ 





 241. Note that a settlement was reached in Knight-Ridder. See, e.g., Newspaper, Coal Owner 
Settle in Long-Running Case, ATHENS NEWS (Dec. 29, 2005), 
https://www.athensnews.com/news/local/newspaper-coal-owner-settle-in-long-running-
case/article_f217f8fe-2fc9-5928-a25a-0eaadbb5d36f.html. 
